Abstract. We study the evolution of preferences and the behavioral outcomes in an n-population setting. Each player has subjective preferences over potential outcomes, and chooses a best response based on his preferences and the information about the opponents' preferences. However, players' actual fitnesses are defined by material payoff functions. Players can observe their opponents' preferences with some fixed probability p. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for stability for p = 1 and p = 0. We also check the robustness of these results against small perturbations in p for the case of pure-strategy outcomes.
Introduction
The indirect evolutionary approach is a model for studying the evolution of preferences. In this setting, players choose strategies to maximize their subjective preferences rather than playing pre-programmed strategies, but they receive the actual fitnesses defined by material payoff functions which may be distinct from their preferences. Eventually, evolutionary selection is driven by differences in fitness values. We can think that evolutionary processes shape behavior through the effects on players' preferences.
This evolutionary approach can be used to explain how behavior appearing inconsistent with material self-interest, such as altruism, vengeance, punishment, fairness, and reciprocity, may be evolutionarily stable.
1 In the indirect evolutionary approach literature, almost every concept of static stability is built on a symmetric two-player game played by a single population of players without identifying their positions.
2 However, it is a common phenomenon that players know exactly what their roles are in strategic interactions. For example, they may be males and females, buyers and sellers, employers and employees, or parents and their children. In this paper, we investigate the case of separate populations within the framework of the indirect evolutionary approach: players drawn from different populations may have different action sets and different material payoff functions; every player knows his position and has personal preferences over potential outcomes.
In a standard evolutionary game theoretic model where players are programmed to adopt some strategies, there are two quite different ways of extending the definition of an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) from a single-population setting to a multi-population setting.
3 The multi-population stability criterion suggested by Taylor (1979) is based on average fitness values aggregated over all player positions. Such a criterion may be particularly appropriate for coevolutionary games. Cressman (1992) introduces a seemingly weaker criterion for multi-population evolutionary stability: the stability is ensured if new entrants earn less in at least one population. Indeed, it can be shown that both criteria are equivalent to the following one: for any n-player game, a strategy profile is evolutionarily stable if and only if it is a strict Nash equilibrium.
4 Therefore, the extension of the ESS concept to multiple populations is quite restrictive. However, unlike those of evolutionarily stable strategy profiles, we show that the properties of multi-population stability underlying the indirect evolutionary approach with complete information will depend on which stability concept is adopted, and on how many populations are considered. Some of the arguments we discuss in this paper will help us understand how multiple populations interact with one another in such an environment. Dekel et al. (2007) use the indirect evolutionary approach to study endogenous preferences in a single-population setting. This study offers two methodological contributions to the work on the evolution of preferences, namely that all possible preferences are allowed, and that various degrees of observability are considered.
5
To extend the static stability criterion based on the indirect evolutionary approach for multi-population interactions, we apply the concept of a two-species ESS introduced in Cressman (1992) to the model of Dekel et al. (2007) . Remarkably, the objective game, whose entries represent the actual fitnesses, may be either symmetric or asymmetric when focusing on the multi-population cases. Even if the objective game is symmetric, the stable outcomes may still be different because, unlike interactions in a single-population setting, here a preference type never plays against himself.
We suppose that there are n large populations, which may be polymorphic, meaning that not all individuals in a population have the same preferences. In any match of n players drawn from the separate populations, one for each player position, an equilibrium is played to maximize their preferences based on the information about the opponents. If one preference type receives the highest average fitness in the population, this type will prevail, that is, the population evolves. Naturally, the stability criterion is developed for a configuration, which consists of a distribution of preferences in n populations and an equilibrium determining what strategies should be adopted. If a configuration is resistant to invasion by rare mutants, it should have the characteristics: after introduction of a mutant profile, every incumbent will not be wiped out and the post-entry equilibrium behavior gets arbitrarily close to the pre-entry one if the population shares of the mutants are sufficiently small.
Our multi-population stability is defined for any degree of observability, as in Dekel et al. (2007) , with which equilibrium behavior is definitely determined. We begin by studying two extreme cases: in one each player can observe the opponents' preference types, and in the other each player knows only the distribution of opponents' types. We then consider intermediate cases to investigate the robustness of the results of the two extreme case studies. Because all possible preferences are considered and a lot of preference relations may induce the same best-response 4 Selten (1980) applies the ESS concept to asymmetric two-player games, for which each individual is randomly assigned a player role. It turns out that a strategy in the symmetrized game is an ESS if and only if the associated strategy pair is a strict Nash equilibrium of the asymmetric game. Thus, those two-species definitions followed from Taylor (1979) and Cressman (1992) are all equivalent to this role-conditioned single-population definition; see Swinkels (1992) and Weibull (1995, p. 167) .
5 Samuelson (2001) regards the indirect evolutionary approach as incomplete, since only a few possible preferences are considered for applications in some special games, and those new results always rely on the assumption that preferences are perfectly observable.
correspondence, we are interested in the evolutionarily viable outcome rather than the emergence of one particular preference type. Under the assumption that preferences are observable, the key feature of the indirect evolutionary approach is that players can adjust their strategies according to specific opponents. Since we allow for all possible preferences to compete, such adjustments made based on preferences can lead to Pareto improvements in fitness outcomes: an inefficient outcome will be destabilized by entrants having the "secret handshake" flavour, which refer to the appropriate mutants playing the inefficient outcome when matched against the incumbents and attaining a more efficient outcome when matched against themselves.
6 Therefore, it is not hard to see that under perfect observability, a configuration is stable only if an equilibrium outcome is Pareto efficient, rather than a Nash equilibrium, in the objective game. This result also indicates that an individual endowed with materialist preferences, which coincide with fitness maximization, may have no evolutionary advantage.
7
In the single-population model established by Dekel et al. (2007) , if a configuration is stable under complete information, the fitness an incumbent receives in each of his matches is efficient ; moreover, the efficient fitness is obviously unique for a symmetric objective game.
8 9 In our multi-population setting, although the forms of Pareto efficiency may not be unique and the populations are allowed to be polymorphic, the uniqueness of the fitness vector can still be ensured for a stable configuration, in the sense that all equilibrium outcomes adopted by n matched incumbents correspond to the same Pareto-efficient fitness vector. An efficient form of a stable configuration for an objective game is well defined, and it is determined by an initial preference distribution.
When the number of populations is equal to two, we obtain a simple sufficient condition for stability under complete information: a Pareto-efficient strict Nash equilibrium of the objective game is stable. This result would also lead us to see that another concept of multi-population stability, such as in Taylor (1979) , can achieve different stability properties. However, if the number of populations increases, then mutants may have opportunities to take evolutionary advantages by applying various correlated deviations regardless of the incumbents' responses, and so the stability may be difficult to attain. We present several examples of threeplayer games which are particularly useful in helping us understand how multiple populations interact with one another to destroy Pareto-efficient strict Nash equilibria, even though these are Pareto-efficient strong Nash equilibria. Compared to the results of studies of evolutionarily stable strategies in asymmetric games, once again, the characteristic of the indirect evolutionary approach causes a dramatic change in the existence of stable multi-population configurations.
We then study the case of unobservable preferences, where players know only the distribution of opponents' preferences in every population; the interactions among players can be described as an n-player Bayesian game. Here the stability criterion is consistent with the concept used for perfect observability. In contrast to that 6 Robson (1990) demonstrates that any inefficient ESS can be destroyed by the so-called "secret handshake" mutant.
7 Heifetz et al. (2007) show a similar result established for almost every game with continuous strategy spaces: under any payoff-monotonic selection dynamics, the population does not converge to material payoff-maximizing behavior. 8 Efficiency of a strategy in a symmetric two-player game means that no other strategy yields a strictly higher fitness when played against itself. 9 When preferences are observable, the tendency towards efficient strategy is a general property of single-population models based on the indirect evolutionary approach; see also Possajennikov (2005) and von Widekind (2008).
of Dekel et al. (2007) , our criterion rejects the incumbents' post-entry strategies that are too far from the originals. We give an example to show how the difference between the two stability criteria affects the determination of the stability of a configuration.
Since players cannot adjust their strategies according to specific opponents in this case, a non-Nash outcome will be destabilized by entrants adopting material payoff-maximizing behavior. It is also easy to see that under incomplete information, individuals endowed with materialist preferences have evolutionary advantages. Thus, whether such a materialist configuration is stable will depend on whether the incumbents' post-entry strategies are nearly unchanged. We show that a strategy profile can be supported by stable materialist preferences if it is a strict Nash equilibrium or a completely mixed Nash equilibrium or the unique Nash equilibrium of the objective game. The indirect evolutionary approach with unobservable preferences can be viewed as a refinement of the Nash equilibrium concept different from the notion of a neutrally stable strategy (NSS), which was introduced in Maynard Smith (1982) .
Finally, we consider the case in which players observe their opponents' preferences with probability p ∈ (0, 1), and know only the distribution of opponents' preferences with probability 1 − p. The stability criterion defined in this intermediate case is such that the criteria under perfect observability and no observability can be regarded as its two limits. This makes it possible to check the robustness of the preceding stability results against small perturbations in the degrees of observability for the case of pure-strategy outcomes.
In the single-population model of Dekel et al. (2007) , efficiency is a necessary condition for pure-strategy outcomes to be stable when observability is almost perfect. However, we provide a counterexample illustrating that the necessity result in our multi-population setting with perfect observability is not robust. Unlike efficiency defined for the single-population model, a Pareto improvement is not a change leaving everyone strictly better off. Therefore, a Pareto-dominated outcome in our model may not be destabilized if preferences are not perfectly observed. Instead of Pareto efficiency, we show that weak Pareto efficiency is a necessary condition for pure-strategy outcomes to be stable under almost perfect observability. This result reveals that materialist preferences still may have no evolutionary advantage even if preferences are observed with noise.
10 In contrast, the necessity result under no observability is robust: a pure-strategy outcome is stable under almost no observability only if it is a Nash equilibrium of the objective game.
Regarding the sufficient conditions for stability, we show that when the number of populations is equal to two, a Pareto-efficient strict Nash equilibrium of the objective game remains stable for all degrees of observability. However, the sufficiency result under no observability is not robust. We provide an example of a prisoner's dilemma situation in which the unique Nash equilibrium, also a strict Nash equilibrium, is not stable for any positive probability of observing preferences. The use of entrants' cooperative strategies in this example indicates that efficiency would play a role in preference evolution as long as preferences are not completely unobservable.
The Model
Objective Games. Suppose that G is an n-player game with the player set N = {1, . . . , n}. For each i ∈ N , denote by A i the finite set of actions available to player i, and define A = i∈N A i . Let π i : A → R be the material payoff function for player i. When an action profile a ∈ A is played, we interpret the material payoff π i (a) as the reproductive fitness received by player i, which determines the evolutionary success. Thus we also call π i the fitness function for player i. We write the set of mixed strategies of player i as ∆(A i ), and denote the set of correlated strategies by ∆(A). Each material payoff function π i can be extended by linearity to a continuous function defined on the set i∈N ∆(A i ), or defined on the set ∆(A).
By combining the n material payoff functions, we obtain the vector-valued function π : A → R n that assigns to each action profile a the n-tuple (π 1 (a), . . . , π n (a)) of fitness values. This fitness function π can also be extended to the set i∈N ∆(A i ), or to the set ∆(A), through π 1 , . . . , π n . In the indirect evolutionary approach, behavior of players is determined independently of the material payoff functions, although players' actual fitnesses are defined by them. We call this game G an objective game.
Subjective Games. In contrast to an objective game, a subjective game describes the strategic interactions among the players. There are n separate populations, and the number of individuals in each population is infinite. In every game round, players are drawn independently from the n populations, one from each population randomly. Let such a game be repeated infinitely many times independently; then it is plausible that a player will not take into account the effect of his current behavior on the opponents' future behavior.
Each player in the i-th population chooses an optimal strategy from the set ∆(A i ) based on his own preferences and the information about his opponents' preferences. We assume that the subjective preferences of player i can be represented by a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function which may be different from the material payoff function π i . However, after each round of play, the actual fitness received by player i is π i (σ) if a strategy profile σ ∈ i∈N ∆(A i ) is chosen by matched players. Let Θ = R A , which represents the set of von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions on A. We refer to a utility function either as a preference type or as a type; we identify it with a group of players who have such preferences and make the same decisions. In real life, different individuals having the same preference relation may adopt distinct strategies when they are indifferent among some alternatives. In such a case, any two of these preferences can be represented by different utility functions congruent modulo a positive affine transformation.
Assume that there are only a finite number of preference types in each population. Denote by M(Θ n ) the set of all possible joint distributions of n independent random variables defined on the same sample space Θ with finite support. Let µ ∈ M(Θ n ). Then the support of µ can be written as supp µ = i∈N supp µ i , where µ i is the marginal distribution over all types of player i. For a given preference profile θ ∈ supp µ and for k ∈ N , the conditional probability µ(θ −k |θ k ) is equal to i =k µ i (θ i ). For notational simplicity, we write µ −k (θ −k ) and supp µ −k for µ(θ −k |θ k ) and i =k supp µ i , respectively. Similarly, we write supp µ T and supp µ −T for i∈T supp µ i and i / ∈T supp µ i , respectively, where T is a nonempty proper subset of N .
To enable a comparison with the single-population setting introduced in Dekel et al. (2007) , hereafter DEY, information about opponents' types is described as follows. For every i ∈ N , player i observes the opponents' preferences with probability p ∈ [0, 1], and knows only the joint distribution µ −i over the opponents' preferences with probability 1 − p.
11 The degree of observability p is an exogenous parameter indicating the level of observation, and is common knowledge among all players. But the two realizations, called perfect observability and no observability, are private and independent across players. In every round, players choose best responses to expected actions of others under a given degree of observability, which can be described as an n-player Bayesian game. Such a game is denoted by Γ p (µ) and called a subjective game; the pair (G, Γ p (µ)) is referred to as an environment.
The Stability Concept. According to the principle of the "survival of the fittest", only preference types earning the highest average fitness will survive. Thus, a necessary condition for an environment (G, Γ p (µ)) to be stable is that for any i ∈ N , all incumbents in the i-th population, which constitute the set supp µ i , should receive the same average fitness. On the other hand, it is necessary to verify whether the incumbents are immune to the competition from new entrants. Because mutations are rare events, it is assumed that at the same time, there will be at most one mutant type arising in each of the n populations. Let J = {i 1 , . . . , i k } be any nonempty subset of N . A mutant sub-profile for J, denoted by θ J , refers to a k-tuple of preference types ( θ i1 , . . . ,
c , where (supp µ j ) c is the complement of supp µ j .
12 The vector (ε i1 , . . . , ε i k ) of the population shares of the k mutant types is often denoted simply by ε, and we define its norm to be ε = max{ε i1 , . . . , ε i k }.
13 After the mutants have entered, the resulting n populations can be characterized by the post-entry distribution µ ε :
where δ θi is the degenerate probability (Dirac measure) concentrated at θ i . In a single-population evolutionary model, the static stability criterion generally requires that mutants entering the population are eventually driven to extinction. For multi-population settings, it should be natural to us to extend the stability definition in terms of the notion of a mutant sub-profile, which would be regarded as a unit of mutation. We say that a mutant sub-profile is driven out if one of these mutant types will become extinct. In other words, a multi-population stability criterion can be fulfilled if for any given mutant sub-profile, there are mutants earning a lower average fitness than the incumbents in at least one population. The reason for this is that in the models based on the indirect evolutionary approach, interactions among mutants may look as if a sub-profile of mutants cooperate with one another such that some of the mutants take fitness advantages at the expense of the other mutants. Those fitness advantages will soon disappear when the latter 11 Here, partial observability is used to model the noise in the cases of perfect observability and no observability. For simplicity, we ignore the possibility that an individual has complete information about the preferences of some of the opponents and has incomplete information about the preferences of the others. We emphasize that the difference in the two noise settings does not affect our results.
12 It indicates that all preference relations satisfying the von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms are allowed to compete, and that mutants are distinguishable from the incumbents in the post-entry populations, although they may have the same preference relation.
13 Since each population is assumed to be infinite, the population share of a mutant type can take on any positive value, no matter how small it may be.
go extinct. This concept is consistent with that of the multi-population ESS formulated by Cressman (1992) , one of the two most popular static stability criteria for multi-population interactions.
14 Because there are no restrictions on the preference relations of entrants and the best-response correspondences for different preferences may coincide, we allow that mutants may survive in a post-entry environment to coexist with the incumbents, but will not spread.
15 Our stability criterion is defined to identify when a joint preference distribution and an adopted Bayesian-Nash equilibrium can form a stable configuration. Except that all incumbents in the same population earn the same average fitness, a stable multi-population configuration should satisfy: after a rare mutant sub-profile appears,
(1) the behavioral outcomes remain unchanged or nearly unchanged; (2) the mutant sub-profile is driven out, or the incumbents can coexist with the mutants in every population.
Along these lines, although the failure of a mutant sub-profile is determined solely by one mutant type among them, such multi-population extension can quite satisfy the appropriate stability conditions as introduced in DEY: there is no single mutant sub-profile that can obviously destabilize the configuration including the behavioral outcomes and the distribution of preferences (see Remarks 3.2.1 and 3.3.1). We shall formally define stability criteria for various degrees of observability in the following sections; these definitions follow the same principle of multi-population stability. We develop necessary and sufficient conditions for stability beginning with the two extreme cases, p = 1 (perfect observability) and p = 0 (no observability). Next, we consider intermediate cases, p ∈ (0, 1) (partial observability), such that the two extreme cases can be regarded as its two limiting cases. We check whether or not the preceding results, under p = 1 and p = 0, are robust against small perturbations in p for the case of pure-strategy outcomes.
Perfect Observability
In this section we discuss the case where the degree of observability is equal to one, that is, players' preferences are common knowledge. Therefore, the subjective game in each round of play can be seen as an n-player strategic game.
For a given probability distribution µ ∈ M(Θ n ), a strategy adopted by player i under perfect observability is a function b i : supp µ → ∆(A i ).
16 The vectorvalued function b : supp µ → i∈N ∆(A i ) defined by b(θ) = (b 1 (θ), . . . , b n (θ)) is an equilibrium in the subjective game Γ 1 (µ) if for each θ ∈ supp µ, the strategy profile b(θ) is a Nash equilibrium of the associated strategic game plated by the n-tuple θ, that is, for each i ∈ N ,
where we write b −i (θ) instead of b(θ) −i . Let B 1 (µ) denote the set of all such equilibria in Γ 1 (µ). A pair (µ, b) consisting of a preference distribution µ ∈ M(Θ n ) and an equilibrium b ∈ B 1 (µ) is called a configuration. We define the aggregate 14 There are two popular ways of extending the definition of an ESS to a multi-population setting. One is due to Taylor (1979) , and the other is due to Cressman (1992) ; see also Swinkels (1992) , Weibull (1995), and Sandholm (2010) .
15 This idea is consistent with the notion of a neutrally stable strategy. 16 It is admitted that players whose preference types are congruent modulo a positive affine transformation may adopt distinct strategies.
outcome of a configuration (µ, b) as the probability distribution ϕ µ,b over the set of pure-strategy profiles:
for every (a 1 , . . . , a n ) ∈ A, where b i (θ)(a i ) is the probability assigned by b i (θ) to a i . The aggregate outcome of a configuration can be regarded as a correlated strategy belonging to ∆(A). A strategy profile σ ∈ i∈N ∆(A i ) is called an aggregate outcome if the induced correlated strategy ϕ σ is the aggregate outcome of some configuration, where ϕ σ is defined by ϕ σ (a 1 , . . . , a n ) = i∈N σ i (a i ) for all (a 1 , . . . , a n ) ∈ A. By applying the law of large numbers to our setting, the average fitness of a type θ i ∈ supp µ i with respect to (µ, b) for i ∈ N is given by
on which the evolution of preferences depends.
17 For a configuration to be evolutionarily stable, it is necessary to let every incumbent in the same population earn the same average fitness.
Under complete information, in order to satisfy the condition that rare mutants cannot cause the behavioral outcomes to move far away, we assume that when n incumbents are matched against one another, they continue to play the pre-entry equilibrium, called the focal property. However, after an entry, it seems implausible that we can say which equilibrium will be played when not all matched players are incumbents. Thus, in such matches, there are no restrictions on the set of equilibria from which they can choose.
Definition 3.2. Let (µ, b) be a configuration with perfect observability, and suppose that a mutant sub-profile θ J ∈ j∈J (supp µ j ) c with ε ∈ (0, 1) |J| is introduced.
Remark 3.2.1. When preferences are observable, the focal set B 1 ( µ ε ; b) is always nonempty regardless of how the population share vector ε is composed. In addition, the desired property that
Now the stability criterion for a perfectly observable environment can be defined.
is said to be stable if it is balanced, and if for any nonempty subset J ⊆ N and any mutant sub-profile θ J ∈ j∈J (supp µ j ) c , there exists someǭ ∈ (0, 1) such that for every ε ∈ (0, 1) |J| with ε ∈ (0,ǭ) and every
for some j ∈ J and for every θ j ∈ supp µ j ;
17 The equation for average fitness indicates that the preference distribution is unchanged in the process of learning to play an equilibrium. To justify this representation, we assume as in most related literature that the evolution of preferences is infinitely slower than the process of learning, which is supported by Selten (1991, p. 21) .
(
for every i ∈ N and for every θ i , θ i ∈ supp µ ε i . A strategy profile σ ∈ i∈N ∆(A i ) is stable if it is the aggregate outcome of some stable configuration.
Condition (i) describes the case where every incumbent earns a strictly higher average fitness than the mutant type in some population, and thus this mutant sub-profile fails to invade. Condition (ii) describes the case where the post-entry configuration is balanced; the incumbents and the mutants can continue to coexist in every population. Let us for a moment follow the notion of evolutionary stability introduced in Taylor (1979) , where the fitness comparison between incumbents and mutants should be done in the aggregate. Under such a view, the form of new entrants could be represented as ( θ 1 , . . . , θ n ) / ∈ supp µ with a population share ε, and Condition (i) for a polymorphic configuration (µ, b) could be replaced by the condition:
holds for every (θ 1 , . . . , θ n ) ∈ supp µ. Unlike extending the definition of an ESS to a multi-population setting, such a stability criterion is indeed stronger than ours. The key difference is the ability to adjust one's strategies according to the opponents; see the discussion after Theorem 3.10.
The following remarks describe the basic characteristics of our multi-population stability criterion, which is defined separately for each information assumption.
Remark 3.3.1. If the multi-population stability criterion is reached, then no incumbent would be wiped out, although Condition (i) can be determined just by examining one of the populations for each mutant sub-profile. The intuition behind this result is as follows. Let a mutant sub-profile θ J be introduced into a stable configuration (µ, b), and suppose that Condition (i) holds. Then those mutants with the lowest average fitness in their own populations will be wiped out. Such a trend can make the sub-profile θ J converge to a smaller sub-profile θ J ′ . Meanwhile, the population shares of the incumbents may be slightly perturbed during this process. One could therefore regard the post-entry environment at this time as the perturbed configuration in which the new sub-profile θ J ′ tries its luck. Recall that the stable configuration (µ, b) is defined for any mutant sub-profile. Thus, after the entry of θ J ′ , either Condition (i) or Condition (ii) would be satisfied, provided that the population shares of these remaining mutants are sufficiently small and that the perturbations in the population shares of the incumbents do not affect the order of their average fitness values. Such a repeated process would lead to the desired goal.
Remark 3.3.2. In our stability criterion, the invasion barrierǭ seems to depend on the mutant sub-profile. In fact, the existence of such an invasion barrier is equivalent to the existence of a uniform invasion barrier. Consider an indifferent mutant sub-profile θ 0 J for a nonempty subset J of N .
18 Since an indifferent type θ 0 j is indifferent among all actions, all available actions will be dominant for him. Hence, by the condition that all possible focal equilibria are admitted in a post-entry environment, the barrierǭ J which works for the indifferent mutant sub-profile θ 0 J is certainly a uniform invasion barrier against all mutant sub-profiles for the subset J. Thus, since the number of all subsets of N is finite, we have a uniform invasion barrier that can work for all potential mutant sub-profiles. This also indicates 18 A preference type is said to be indifferent if it is a constant utility function; a mutant sub-profile is said to be indifferent if all its preference types are indifferent.
that it is sufficient to check indifferent mutant sub-profiles, rather than all mutant sub-profiles, in order to test the stability of a configuration.
Consider the Battle of the Sexes as introduced in Dawkins (1976) , which refers to the male-female conflict over parental care of offspring, and which is one of the most simple asymmetric games without an ESS. The two female strategies are coy and fast; the two male strategies are faithful and philandering. Coy females insist on a long courtship before mating, whereas fast ones do not. All females take care of their offspring. Faithful males tolerate a long courtship, and also care for the offspring. Philanderers refuse to engage in a long courtship, and do not care for their offspring. The value of the offspring to each parent is V . The cost of raising the offspring is 2C, which can be borne by one parent only, or shared equally between both parents. The cost of a long courtship is c to each participant. Let us consider 0 < c < C < c + C < V < 2C. Then, as discussed in van Damme (1991, p. 243) , there is no strict Nash equilibrium, and so there is no ESS in such a case. However, if the Battle of the Sexes is modeled by means of our multi-population setting, then an evolutionarily stable outcome can exist in this game, as we will see below.
Example 3.4. Let the fitness assignment be characterized by the Battle of the Sexes game in which V = 15, C = 10, and c = 3; besides, the first population consists of all males, and the second population consists of all females.
Coy
Fast Faithful 2, 2 5, 5 Philandering 0, 0 15, −5
Let preferences be observable. Suppose that all males have preferences such that they are indifferent between being faithful and being philandering if a female is fast. On the other hand, suppose that females' preferences prompt them to be coy if a male is a philanderer, and to be fast if a male is faithful. Then the pair (Faithful, Fast) is a Nash equilibrium for such males and females, and this strategy pair can be an evolutionarily stable outcome.
To see this, let (µ, b) be the configuration constructed as described above. It is obvious that if mutants appear in only one of the two populations, their average fitnesses cannot be greater than what the incumbents have. Consider two types of mutants θ 1 and θ 2 entering the first and second populations with population shares ε 1 and ε 2 , respectively. Let b be the chosen focal equilibrium, and suppose that for i = 1, 2 and for
Clearly if q 1 = 1 and q 2 = 0, then the post-entry average fitness of θ 2 is equal to 5, and it is strictly greater than that of θ 2 . Finally if q 1 = 1 and q 2 = 0, then the fitness to each individual in each match is 5 except in ( θ 1 , θ 2 ). When the mutants θ 1 and θ 2 are matched together, the Pareto efficiency of the strategy pair (Faithful, Fast) implies that the conditions affording mutants an evolutionary advantage in the first population can result in fitness loss for mutants in the second population. Therefore, we can conclude that the strategy pair (Faithful, Fast) is stable, for which a uniform invasion barrierǭ can be choosen as 3/18.
We list the definitions concerning Pareto efficiency.
Definition 3.5. Let (N, A, π) be a finite strategic game, and let σ and σ ′ be strategy profiles belonging to i∈N ∆(A i ). The strategy profile σ strongly Pareto dominates the strategy profile σ
The strategy profile σ is weakly Pareto efficient if there does not exist another strategy profile that strongly Pareto dominates σ.
The strategy profile σ Pareto dominates the strategy profile σ
The strategy profile σ is Pareto efficient if there does not exist another strategy profile that Pareto dominates σ.
In Example 3.4, the stable outcome (Faithful, Fast) is a Pareto-efficient strategy profile in the Battle of the Sexes game. Our first result will show that this is also true in the general case: if a configuration is stable under perfect observability, then any equilibrium outcome adopted by n matched incumbents must be Pareto efficient with respect to the fitness function π. The reason is simple. If the outcome is not Pareto efficient, the mutants having the "secret handshake" flavour can destroy this inefficient outcome. These mutants behave based on their own preferences; they maintain the pre-entry outcome when matched against the incumbents, and achieve a more efficient outcome when matched against themselves. Accordingly, the observability of preferences plays a key role in obtaining the "stable only if efficient" result.
It is convenient to use the following notation for our multi-population case. Suppose that we are given two n-tuples z = (z 1 , . . . , z n ) and x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ). For any subset T ⊆ N , a new n-tuple (z T , x −T ) can be constructed by letting
Theorem 3.6. Let (µ, b) be a stable configuration in (G, Γ 1 (µ)). Then for each θ ∈ supp µ, the equilibrium outcome b(θ) is Pareto efficient with respect to π.
Proof. Suppose that there existsθ
n ) be introduced with its population share vector ε = (ε 1 , . . . , ε n ). Let the focal equilibrium b ∈ B 1 ( µ ε ; b) be chosen to satisfy (1) b( θ 0 ) = σ; (2) for any proper subset T N and any
Then, for every i ∈ N , the difference between the average fitnesses of θ
Thus, for any vector ε ∈ (0, 1) n , we have
and
A single-population model underlying the indirect evolutionary approach, as in DEY, always shows that when preferences are observed, efficiency is a necessary condition for stability, in the sense that the fitness each incumbent receives in each interaction is efficient. Of course, the concept of efficiency specially defined for symmetric games is distinct from the concept of Pareto efficiency. The efficient fitness used in a single-population model could not be meaningfully applied to a model with n separate populations.
Unlike strategic interactions in a single-population setting, here an individual will only meet opponents coming from the other populations. Thus the same symmetric objective game considered in different population settings could induce quite different stable outcomes, as we will see in the next example.
Example 3.7. Let the following anti-coordination game denote the fitness assignment, where ν > 0, ω > 10, and ν + ω > 20. Suppose that preferences are observable, and that each player i has the same action set {a 1 , a 2 }.
The efficient strategy σ * in this symmetric objective game is such that σ * (a 1 ) = ν+ω 2(ν+ω−10) with the efficient fitness
4(ν+ω−10) . When considered in the singlepopulation model introduced by DEY, the unique efficient strategy profile (σ * , σ * ) is DEY-stable if and only if the equality ν = ω holds. Therefore, if the DEY-stable outcome exists, the efficient fitness is ν 2 2ν−10 , which is strictly less than ν and ω. In the case where ν = ω, all Pareto-efficient strategy profiles in this objective game are (a 1 , a 2 ) and (a 2 , a 1 ), and so Theorem 3.6 implies that the strategy profile (σ * , σ * ) cannot be stable in the sense of multi-population stability. The reason for the difference between the single-and two-population settings is that when the interaction takes place between two mutants from separate populations, they can choose a suitable strategy profile, (a 1 , a 2 ) or (a 2 , a 1 ), to gain evolutionary advantages. However, this cannot happen in a single-population setting, where the mutant type a mutant can encounter is himself. Theorem 3.10 will guarantee that the Pareto-efficient strict Nash equilibria (a 1 , a 2 ) and (a 2 , a 1 ) can be stable if the two-population setting is applied to this symmetric game. Theorem 3.6 says that configurations in our multi-population model tend towards Pareto efficiency whenever preferences are observable. Unlike the efficient fitness for a symmetric game, Pareto-efficient fitness vectors are generally not unique for an arbitrary game. Nevertheless, we can show that if a configuration is stable under perfect observability, the incumbents in the same population always earn the same fitness in each of their interactions, no matter who their opponents are; the fitness vector for any tuple of matched individuals is unique, no matter who their members are.
Proof. We will prove the lemma by proving its equivalent statement: If (µ, b) is a stable configuration in (G, Γ 1 (µ)), then for any nonempty subset S ⊆ N and any θ
We begin with the case that S satisfies |S| = 1. Suppose that there exist θ
c be an indifferent type entering the j-th population with a population share ε ∈ (0, 1). Let b ∈ B 1 ( µ ε ; b) be the adopted equilibrium
Then, by comparing the average fitness of θ 0 j with that of θ ′′ j , we have
Let k ≥ 2, and suppose as an inductive hypothesis that the equality holds for a subset S whenever the number, say m, of S satisfies 1 ≤ m ≤ k − 1. Now let T be a subset of N with |T | = k. Suppose that there exist θ
Consider an indifferent mutant sub-profile θ 0 T−j with its population share vector ε, where T −j denotes T \ {j}. The focal equilibrium b can be chosen to satisfy: for any U ⊆ T −j and any
By our inductive hypothesis, it is not hard to see that 
T ,θ −T ) > 0 regardless of the population share vector ε. Thus, (µ, b) is not stable in (G, Γ 1 (µ)), as desired.
When preferences are observable, Theorem 3.6 and Lemma 3.8 imply that although these separate populations may be polymorphic, a stable configuration induces a unique fitness vector lying on the Pareto frontier of the noncooperative payoff region of the objective game.
20 The average fitness of an incumbent is equal to the fitness value that all incumbents in the same population can earn in each of their matches. Besides, the fitness vector corresponding to a stable aggregate outcome just consists of the fitness values obtained from any matching of the incumbents.
Theorem 3.9. Let (µ, b) be a stable configuration in (G, Γ 1 (µ)), and let ϕ µ,b be the aggregate outcome of (µ, b). Then for each i ∈ N ,
for anyθ i ∈ supp µ i and any θ ∈ supp µ.
Proof. Since (µ, b) is stable, by Lemma 3.8, we let v * = π b(θ) for θ ∈ supp µ. Then for each i ∈ N and anyθ i ∈ supp µ i , the equality Πθ i (µ; b) = v * i is obvious. On the other hand, for any i ∈ N , we have
20 The noncooperative payoff region of an n-player game (N, A, π) refers to the n-dimensional
For any symmetric two-player game considered in a single-population setting, the efficient fitness is certainly uniquely determined for all stable configurations. However, for an arbitrary objective game, stable configurations in our multi-population model may correspond to different Pareto-efficient fitness vectors; the efficient types of stable aggregate outcomes would be determined by initial distributions of preferences. As in Example 3.7, the strategy profiles (a 1 , a 2 ) and (a 2 , a 1 ) with different efficient types could serve as two stable aggregate outcomes supported, respectively, by different preference distributions. This can be confirmed after studying the sufficient condition for stability.
In the single-population model of DEY with complete information, it is shown that efficient strict Nash equilibria of a symmetric two-player game are stable; see also Possajennikov (2005) . In the following theorem, we give a sufficient condition for the two-population setting: in an arbitrary two-player game, every Paretoefficient strict Nash equilibrium can be an evolutionarily stable outcome. At first glance, it seems easy to understand. Suppose that each strategy in a strict Nash equilibrium of an objective game is supported by preferences for which the strategy is strictly dominant. Then any mutant type with a small population share will be wiped out if the mutants adopt any other strategy when matched against the incumbents. On the other hand, Pareto efficiency implies that when two mutants from separate populations are matched, the fitness of one mutant type cannot be improved without worsening the fitness of the other. All this seems quite straightforward. However, unlike in the single-population setting, it is difficult to find a uniform invasion barrier valid for all focal equilibria in the two-population setting.
21
Theorem 3.10. Let G be a two-player game and let (a * 1 , a * 2 ) be Pareto efficient with respect to π. If (a * 1 , a * 2 ) is a strict Nash equilibrium of G, then (a * 1 , a * 2 ) is stable in (G, Γ 1 (µ)) for some µ ∈ M(Θ 2 ).
Proof. Let (a * 1 , a * 2 ) be a strict Nash equilibrium of G, and suppose that it is not a stable strategy profile. We shall show that (a * 1 , a * 2 ) is not Pareto efficient with respect to π. To see this, consider a monomorphic configuration (µ, b) where each i-th population consists of θ * i for which a * i is the strictly dominant strategy. Then (a * 1 , a * 2 ) is the aggregate outcome of (µ, b), and hence this configuration cannot be stable under our assumptions on (a * 1 , a * 2 ). This means that there exists a mutant sub-profile θ J for some J ⊆ {1, 2} such that for everyǭ ∈ (0, 1), these mutants, with some ε ∈ (0, 1) |J| satisfying ε ∈ (0,ǭ), can adopt an equilibrium b ∈ B 1 ( µ ε ; b) to gain evolutionary advantages over the incumbents, that is,
for all j ∈ J, and
In the case where |J| = 1, it is clear that mutants have no evolutionary advantage since (a * 1 , a * 2 ) is a Nash equilibrium. Let J = {1, 2}, and suppose that ( θ 1 , θ 2 ) is a mutant pair having an evolutionary advantage. For a given ε ∈ (0, 1) 2 and for each i ∈ {1, 2}, the post-entry average fitness of the incumbent type θ * i is
21 Note that perfect observability is a limiting case of partial observability, which will be studied in Section 5. When preferences are unobservable, each individual knows the joint distribution over the types before deciding which strategy will be adopted. This implies throughout the paper that the stability criterion can only be defined by taking a uniform invasion barrier against all focal equilibria, rather than an invasion barrier depending on a given focal equilibrium.
On the other hand, the post-entry average fitness of the mutant type θ i is
Using the assumption that the mutant pair ( θ 1 , θ 2 ) has an evolutionary advantage, we gradually reduceǭ to 0, and then the sequence of the norms of the corresponding population share vectors converges to 0. We can choose a sequence { b t } from the corresponding focal equilibria such that one of the three following cases occurs. To complete the proof, we will show that (a * 1 , a * 2 ) is Pareto dominated in any one of these cases. 2 ) is a strict Nash equilibrium, we have ε
for every t. We can assume that π 2 (a *
it can be deduced that
for every t. Sinceǭ converges to 0, we obtain
and it implies that π b t ( θ 1 , θ 2 ) converges to π(a * 1 , a * 2 ). Otherwise, by applying the fact that the noncooperative payoff region π 2 i=1 ∆(A i ) is compact, there exists a strategy profile ( σ 1 , σ 2 ) such that π( σ 1 , σ 2 ) is a limit point of the set { π b t ( θ 1 , θ 2 ) | t ∈ Z + }, and it Pareto dominates (a * 1 , a * 2 ) in terms of π 1 ( σ 1 , σ 2 ) > π 1 (a * 1 , a * 2 ) and π 2 ( σ 1 , σ 2 ) = π 2 (a * 1 , a * 2 ). Summing up, we deduce that there exists a sequence {π b t ( θ 1 , θ 2 ) } converging to π(a * 1 , a * 2 ) with π 1 b t ( θ 1 , θ 2 ) > π 1 (a * 1 , a * 2 ) and π 2 (a * 1 , a * 2 ) > π 2 b t ( θ 1 , θ 2 ) for all t; moreover, the curve connecting the sequence has a horizontal tangent line at π(a * 1 , a * 2 ). If π(a * 1 , a * 2 ) lies on the Pareto frontier of π 2 i=1 ∆(A i ) , then intuitively it seems that there exists a strictly convex subregion of π 2 i=1 ∆(A i ) containing this sequence, which contradicts the shape of a noncooperative payoff region. Therefore (a * 1 , a * 2 ) should not be a Pareto-efficient strategy profile. This can be formally proved using the properties of extreme points of a noncooperative payoff region; see Tu and Juang (2017) . 2 ) is a strict Nash equilibrium, that the mutant pair ( θ 1 , θ 2 ) has an evolutionary advantage, and that the corresponding norm ε t converges to 0. Thus, by comparing the postentry average fitnesses of θ * i and θ i , we obtain ε
for all i and all t, and it follows that
for each i ∈ {1, 2}. We discuss all the possibilities. If 1
2 ) is Pareto dominated. Next, because ξ t 2 /ξ t 1 → ∞ and ξ t 1 /ξ t 2 → ∞ cannot occur simultaneously, the remaining possibility is that 1
where either i = 1 or i = 2. In each case, it implies that ξ t 1 → 0 and ξ t 2 → 0. Without loss of generality, let i = 1. Then it is reasonable to suppose that the
2 ) is Pareto dominated by some b t ( θ 1 , θ 2 ). From comparing the post-entry average fitness of θ * 2 with that of θ 2 , we know that
for all t. Because we let i = 1, and the term π 2 (a *
Then, as discussed in Case 2 of this proof, the strategy profile (a * 1 , a * 2 ) cannot be Pareto efficient.
Let a * be a Pareto-efficient strict Nash equilibrium of a two-player game, so that it is stable by Theorem 3.10. Now suppose that the utilitarian social welfare function is not maximized at a * , that is, there is a strategy pairā such that
Then a configuration supporting the aggregate outcome a * would be invaded and displaced by a mutant pair with the "secret handshake" flavour, provided that the criterion for invasion is derived based on Taylor (1979) , as described after Definition 3.3. Such a mutant pair can destroy a * by selectingā when matched against themselves and by maintaining a * when matched against the incumbents. This says that a * cannot be stable under this stability criterion, where evolutionary success depends on the aggregation of the average fitnesses. Therefore, unlike extending the ESS concept for asymmetric two-population games, the concepts of stability introduced by Taylor (1979) and Cressman (1992) are not equivalent in the multi-population models based on the indirect evolutionary approach with perfect observability.
Regarding the sufficient conditions for stability, it is worth emphasizing that when the number of populations is greater than or equal to three, the properties of Pareto-efficient strict Nash equilibria are not sufficient for a strategy profile to be stable. It is crucial to note that when the number of populations increases, there may exist possibilities of correlated deviations such that mutants could have evolutionary advantages over the incumbents without expense to themselves. For this reason, a stable strategy profile may fail to exist, even though the objective game has a Pareto-efficient strong Nash equilibrium. 22 The following examples will illustrate some of these various possibilities.
Example 3.11. Let the objective game G be the following three-player game, and suppose that the set of possible actions available to player i is {a i1 , a i2 } for i = 1, 2, 3.
a 22 a 11 7, 7, 7 3, 1, 3 a 12 1, 3, 3 8, 7, 0 a 31 a 21 a 22 a 11 1, 3, 3 0, 0, 0 a 12 0, 0, 0 7, 7, 0 a 32
Then the strategy profile (a 11 , a 21 , a 31 ) is a Pareto-efficient strong Nash equilibrium of G. Suppose that preferences are observable, and let (µ, b) be a configuration with the aggregate outcome (a 11 , a 21 , a 31 ), so that b(θ) = (a 11 , a 21 , a 31 ) for all θ ∈ supp µ. Consider three indifferent mutant types θ , and θ 3 is an incumbent in supp µ 3 adopting the strategy σ 3 ∈ ∆({a 31 , a 32 }); (2) otherwise b( θ 1 , θ 2 , θ 3 ) = (a 11 , a 21 , a 31 ).
It is easy to verify that no matter what the mutants' population share vector ε is and no matter what the strategy σ 3 an incumbent in the third population adopts, we have
for all incumbents θ 1 , θ 2 , and θ 3 . Additionally, if there is an incumbent in the third population who does not adopt the pure strategy a 32 when matched against θ 0 1 and θ
for all θ 1 ∈ supp µ 1 . Thus (a 11 , a 21 , a 31 ) cannot be a stable aggregate outcome.
The features discussed in Example 3.11 can be generalized.
Proposition 3.12. Let σ * ∈ i∈N ∆(A i ) be a strategy profile in G. Suppose that there exist J ⊆ N and σ J ∈ j∈J ∆(A j ) such that for each σ −J ∈ i∈N \J ∆(A i ),
for all j ∈ J. Then σ * cannot be stable under perfect observability either if for a given σ −J the above inequality is strict for at least one j, or if there exists some
22 A strategy profile x is a strong Nash equilibrium if for any J ⊆ N and any σ J ∈ j∈J ∆(A j ),
Proof. Suppose that for each σ −J ∈ i∈N \J ∆(A i ), there exists j ∈ J such that π j ( σ J , σ −J ) > π j (σ * ). Let (µ, b) be a stable configuration with the aggregate outcome σ * , so that by Theorem 3.9, π b(θ) = π(σ * ) for all θ ∈ supp µ. Consider an indifferent mutant sub-profile θ 0 J with its population share vector ε. Let b be the adopted focal equilibrium satisfying: (1) π b( θ 0 S , θ −S ) = π(σ * ) for any S J and any θ −S ∈ supp µ −S ; (2) b( θ 0 J , θ −J ) = ( σ J , σ −J ) for any θ −J ∈ supp µ −J , where σ −J is a possible strategy profile chosen by θ −J . Then, regardless of the vector ε, the incumbent populations can be invaded, and at least one θ 0 j will take over the entire j-th population. This is a contradiction to the stability of (µ, b).
Now suppose that there exists a fixed
Similarly, the existence of a stable configuration with the aggregate outcome σ * would yield a contradiction, since such a stable configuration, say (µ, b), can be invaded and displaced by an indifferent mutant subprofile θ 0 J∪{k} , provided that the adopted focal equilibrium b satisfies the conditions:
, where θ −J consists of incumbents from supp µ −J and σ −J is a strategy profile chosen by them; (2) otherwise the equation π b( θ) = π(σ * ) holds. Here, the mutant type θ 0 k would spread to the entire k-th population.
In addition to the above possibilities, evolutionary advantages of mutants also can come from the averages over their interactions.
Example 3.13. Suppose that preferences are observable. Let the following threeplayer game represent the objective game G, and let {a i1 , a i2 } be the action set of player i for i = 1, 2, 3.
a 22 a 11 7, 7, 7 9, 6, 0 a 12 6, 0, 9 6, 0, 9 a 31 a 21 a 22 a 11 0, 9, 6 9, 6, 0 a 12 0, 9, 6 1, 1, 1 a 32
In this game, there are additional conditions imposed on the Pareto-efficient strong Nash equilibrium (a 11 , a 21 , a 31 ): the fitness values of all the deviants will be reduced for any deviation. Even so, this strategy profile (a 11 , a 21 , a 31 ) is not stable. To verify this, let (a 11 , a 21 , a 31 ) be the aggregate outcome of a configuration (µ, b). For i = 1, 2, 3, consider an indifferent mutant type θ 0 i entering the i-th population with a population share ε i , and suppose that the adopted focal equilibrium b satisfies the conditions: for any (θ 1 , θ 2 , θ 3 ) ∈ supp µ,
3 ) = a 32 . Let ε i = ε 0 for all i. Then, for any ε 0 > 0 and for i = 1, 2, 3, the difference between the average fitnesses of θ 0 i and θ i is
2 0 > 0, and hence the strategy profile (a 11 , a 21 , a 31 ) is not stable.
We state this three-player case formally in the next proposition.
Proposition 3.14. Let G be a three-player game, and let p be equal to 1. A strategy profile
and there exists i ∈ {1, 2, 3} for which at least one of the inequalities in (a) and (b) is strict.
Propositions 3.12 and 3.14 reveal that under perfect observability, a strategy profile is stable only if there exist no correlated deviations such that regardless of how the incumbents behave, the average fitness achievable for every mutant is at least as high as the average fitnesses of the corresponding incumbents with at least one strict inequality.
Notation. Since the focal set in Definition 3.2 is actually independent of the population shares of mutants, we can define a weaker stability criterion by taking an invasion barrier against a given focal equilibrium, rather than a uniform invasion barrier against all focal equilibria. Under this weaker criterion, we can obtain a very succinct sufficient condition for stability in every n-player game: if a strictly strong Nash equilibrium weakly Pareto dominates all strategy profiles in an n-player game, then it is stable. 
No Observability
In this section we study the features of the case where the degree of observability is equal to zero. We assume that each player is ignorant of the preferences of his opponents, but knows his own type and the joint distribution over the opponents' types. The interactions among players can then be studied as an n-player Bayesian game.
Suppose we are given a probability distribution µ ∈ M(Θ n ). A strategy of each player i under no observability is a function s i : supp µ i → ∆(A i ). The vectorvalued function s : supp µ → i∈N ∆(A i ) defined by s(θ) = (s 1 (θ 1 ), . . . , s n (θ n )) is a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of the subjective game Γ 0 (µ) if for each i ∈ N and each θ i ∈ supp µ i ,
where we write
denote the set of all BayesianNash equilibria of Γ 0 (µ). We call the pair (µ, s) of µ ∈ M(Θ n ) and s ∈ B 0 (µ) a configuration. Here the aggregate outcome of (µ, s), defined as a correlated strategy, can be written in the following form:
for every (a 1 , . . . , a n ) ∈ A. Indeed, it can be induced by the mixed-strategy profile
23 A strategy profile x is a strictly strong Nash equilibrium if for any J ⊆ N and for any σ J ∈ j∈J ∆(A j ) with σ J = x J , there exists some k ∈ J such that π k (x) > π k (σ J , x −J ). In addition, we say that a strategy profile σ weakly Pareto dominates
Therefore, under no observability, we also refer to the mixed-strategy profile x(µ, s) as the aggregate outcome of (µ, s).
For i ∈ N , the average fitness of a type θ i ∈ supp µ i with respect to (µ, s) can be simply represented in terms of the aggregate outcome x(µ, s):
As in the perfectly observable case, a balanced configuration (µ, s) is defined by the equality Π θi (µ; s) = Π θ ′ i (µ; s) holds for every i ∈ N and every θ i , θ ′ i ∈ supp µ i . In a balanced configuration with no observability, the average fitness of any type in each population is equal to the fitness value of the aggregate outcome under the corresponding material payoff function. This is analogous to the result in Theorem 3.9, without resorting to the stability condition.
Lemma 4.1. Let (µ, s) be a balanced configuration in (G, Γ 0 (µ)) with the aggregate outcome x. Then
for every i ∈ N and every θ i ∈ supp µ i .
Proof. Since (µ, s) is a balanced configuration, we have that for each i ∈ N and for any fixed θ i ∈ supp µ i ,
and the proof is complete.
When preferences are unobservable, a focal equilibrium should be defined such that all incumbents' behavior remains unchanged after an entry. However, unlike the case of perfect observability, a focal equilibrium may not always exist, since the incumbents may not be able to ignore the minor perturbation in the distribution of preferences. For this reason, we consider nearby equilibria which can be chosen arbitrarily close to the original one if the population shares of mutants are sufficiently small. Definition 4.2. Suppose that (µ, s) is a configuration with no observability. Let µ ε be a post-entry distribution, and let η ≥ 0 be given.
consisting of all nearby equilibria relative to s within η, called a nearby set.
By definition, a nearby equilibrium s at zero distance from s is just a focal equilibrium relative to s, which is defined by s(θ) = s(θ) for all θ ∈ supp µ. Thus, the nearby set with η = 0 is the focal set, and will be denoted by B 0 ( µ ε ; s). In addition, the relation
0 ( µ ε ; s) holds whenever 0 ≤ η 1 < η 2 . The stability criterion under incomplete information is defined in the same way as in Definition 3.3, except that the focal set is replaced by a nearby set. But what types of nearby sets are relevant if the focal set is empty? In this case, the criterion should require that as long as mutants are rare enough, (1) there exist nearby equilibria arbitrarily close to the pre-entry one; (2) there always exists a suitable nearby set such that all incumbents will not be driven out whenever the adopted equilibrium belongs to this set. It is worth noting that the way of describing a suitable nearby set as presented below is precise but very simplified. We will compare it with another nearby set which needs to be considered in DEY; see Remark 4.3.1 and Example 4.4. Definition 4.3. In (G, Γ 0 (µ)), a configuration (µ, s) is stable if it is balanced, and if for any nonempty J ⊆ N , any θ J ∈ j∈J (supp µ j ) c , and any η > 0, there exist η ∈ [0, η) andǭ ∈ (0, 1) such that for every ε ∈ (0, 1) |J| with ε ∈ (0,ǭ), the nearby set Bη 0 ( µ ε ; s) is nonempty and either (i) or (ii) is satisfied for all s ∈ Bη 0 ( µ ε ; s).
for some j ∈ J and for every θ j ∈ supp µ j .
(ii) Π θi ( µ ε ; s) = Π θi ( µ ε ; s) for every i ∈ N and for every θ i , θ i ∈ supp µ ε i . A strategy profile σ ∈ i∈N ∆(A i ) is said to be stable if there exists a stable configuration (µ, s) such that σ = x(µ, s).
This definition enables us to decide which nearby set is most appropriate, even though there may be more equilibria satisfying the requirement of a given η. After introduction of a mutant sub-profile θ J , if the focal set B 0 ( µ ε ; s) is nonempty for every sufficiently small ε, then the post-entry equilibria that we must consider are those focal equilibria. The stability of (µ, s) ensures that the post-entry aggregate outcomes get arbitrarily close to the original one as in Remark 3.2.1; formally, for any ξ > 0, there existη > 0 andǭ ∈ (0, 1) such that for every ε with ε ∈ (0,ǭ), the relation d(x( µ ε , s), x(µ, s)) < ξ holds for all s ∈ Bη 0 ( µ ε ; s).
Remark 4.3.1. If there are no focal equilibria, the definition of stability in DEY requires that for any η > 0 and for any sufficiently small ε, the entrants do not outperform the incumbents for every nearby equilibrium of B η 0 ( µ ε ; s). However, the nearby set B η 0 ( µ ε ; s) for the given η may contain equilibria which are far from s, no matter how small ε is. The equilibria which are not close enough to s may lead to diverging conclusions regarding the stability, contrary to the original intent of DEY; see Example 4.4. It is worth stressing that, unlike in DEY, we can avoid choosing such equilibria by creating an adequate barrierη for any given η. Based on this observation, it is reasonable to say that the choice of a suitable nearby set in this paper is more relevant for the case of no observability.
Example 4.4. Let (G, Γ 0 (µ)) be a pre-environment under incomplete information, in which G is a two-player game with A i = {a i1 , a i2 , a i3 }, and the i-th population consists of only one preference type θ i . Suppose that 11 , a 21 ) or (a 12 , a 22 ), 1 if a = (a 11 , a 22 ) or (a 12 , a 21 ) , 0 otherwise. Let s(θ 1 , θ 2 ) = ((0.5, 0.5, 0), (0.5, 0.5, 0)); then s is a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of Γ 0 (µ). We claim that under the stability criterion in Definition 4.3, the configuration (µ, s) is stable provided that the objective game G can be represented as follows.
a 21 a 22 a 23 a 11 2, 2 1, 1 0, 2 a 12 1, 1 2, 2 0, 0 a 13 2, 0 0, 0 1, 1 To see why, we introduce a mutant type θ i entering the i-th population with a population share ε i ∈ (0, 1) for i = 1, 2, and let s ∈ B 0 ( µ ε ) be the chosen post-entry equilibrium with s i (θ i ) = (p i1 , p i2 , 1−p i1 −p i2 ) and s i ( θ i ) = (q i1 , q i2 , 1−q i1 −q i2 ) for each i. Assume that s is a nearby equilibrium relative to s so that p 11 , p 12 , p 21 , p 22 = 0, which means that for every i, the following relation holds:
where the j-th component of x is (1−ε j ) s j (θ j )+ε j s j ( θ j ) for j = i. This would imply that for i = 1, 2, we have
, and of course 1−p i1 −p i2 = 0, which are well defined if ε i < 1/2. Applying Kakutani's fixed point theorem to the mutants' best response correspondences, such a nearby equilibrium can be found, and it ensures that there exist post-entry equilibria arbitrarily close to s as ε tends to 0. For each i and for j = i, it can be deduced that
whenever ε j < 1/3. Thus, entrants receive no higher average fitnesses than the incumbents for all nearby equilibria of Bη 0 ( µ ε ; s) ifη and ε are sufficiently small, which proves the claim.
It must be noted that another stability criterion derived from DEY can lead to a different conclusion. Consider the pair ( θ 1 , θ 2 ) of mutant types, each of which satisfies: θ i (a) equals 1 if a = (a 11 , a 21 ), (a 11 , a 23 ), (a 13 , a 21 ), (a 13 , a 23 ), equals 8 if a = (a 12 , a 22 ), and equals 0 otherwise. In this case, it is not difficult to check that the focal set B 0 ( µ ε ; s) is empty whenever ε < 7/9. Now let s ′ be the strategy pair defined by s
, no matter what ε may be. So if η, as described in Remark 4.3.1, is too large, the nearby set B η 0 ( µ ε ; s) would contain s ′ for every ε, and hence the "nearby" equilibrium s ′ should be used to check whether or not the configuration (µ, s) is stable in the sense of DEY. However, for an arbitrary population share vector ε, the inequality Π θi ( µ ε ; s ′ ) > Π θi ( µ ε ; s ′ ) holds for i = 1, 2. This means that the configuration (µ, s) is not stable according to the stability definition proposed by DEY.
24
The previous example demonstrates that as we let the population shares of the mutants continue to decline, even if there are nearby equilibria arbitrarily close to the original, another equilibrium far from the original will always exist at the same time. For consistency with the concept of a focal equilibrium, it is natural to assume that incumbents will adopt strategies that are as close as possible to the original; equilibria relatively far from the original should not be considered. To achieve this, we construct the barrierη that can be adjusted accordingly to exclude such equilibria from the given "nearby" sets; it is a key factor leading to a different conclusion.
In the case of no observability, we first show that a stable aggregate outcome must be a Nash equilibrium of the objective game. The intuition for this is simple. Suppose that the aggregate outcome of a balanced configuration is not a Nash equilibrium. Then entrants can gain a fitness advantage by adopting another strategy, under the assumption that the incumbents' post-entry strategies are nearly unchanged. Obviously, the converse of the "stable only if Nash" result is not true. It is easy to construct examples showing that not every Nash equilibrium can be supported by a stable configuration.
Theorem 4.5. If a configuration (µ, s) is stable in (G, Γ 0 (µ)), then the aggregate outcome of (µ, s) is a Nash equilibrium of G.
Proof. Let x be the aggregate outcome of a stable configuration (µ, s), and suppose that x is not a Nash equilibrium. Then there exist k ∈ N and a k ∈ A k such that π k (a k , x −k ) > π k (x). We have seen in the proof of Lemma 4.1 that a balanced configuration implies that π i (x) = π i s i (θ i ), x −i for all i ∈ N and all θ i ∈ supp µ i , and thus we obtain
for all θ k ∈ supp µ k . Consider the mutant type θ k ∈ (supp µ k ) c appearing in the k-th population, for which a k is the strictly dominant strategy. Then for any postentry equilibrium s, we get s k ( θ k ) = a k , and the average fitnesses of θ k and any θ k ∈ supp µ k are, respectively,
where x = x( µ ε , s). Since π k is continuous on i∈N ∆(A i ) and (4.1) holds for all θ k ∈ supp µ k , the hypothesis that (µ, s) is stable implies that ifη and the population share ε of θ k are small enough, the inequality
holds for all s ∈ Bη 0 ( µ ε ; s) and all θ k ∈ supp µ k (see the discussion after Definition 4.3). Thus we have arrived at a contradiction.
It is no doubt true that under incomplete information, there are no other preference types receiving higher average fitnesses than the players with materialist preferences.
25 Therefore, a Nash equilibrium of the objective game would be supported by a stable configuration, provided that the post-entry strategies of the materialist players can be chosen arbitrarily close to the pre-entry ones, yielding the Nash equilibrium. We will see that such condition is certainly satisfied if the equilibrium is a strict Nash equilibrium or a completely mixed Nash equilibrium or the unique Nash equilibrium of the objective game. Proposition 4.6. Let (µ, s) be a configuration in (G, Γ 0 (µ)), and for every i ∈ N , let supp µ i consist of several types congruent to the fitness function π i . Suppose that for any θ J ∈ j∈J (supp µ j ) c and any η > 0, the nearby set B η 0 ( µ ε ; s) is nonempty for all sufficiently small ε ∈ (0, 1) |J| . Then (µ, s) is stable.
Proof. For each s ∈ B η 0 ( µ ε ; s) and for each incumbent θ i in the i-th population, we obtain
since the preference type θ i can be written as aπ i + b for some a, b ∈ R with a > 0. From this it clearly follows that Π θi ( µ ε ; s) = Π θ ′ i ( µ ε ; s) for every i ∈ N and every θ i , θ ′ i ∈ supp µ i , and that Π θj ( µ ε ; s) ≥ Π θj ( µ ε ; s) for every j ∈ J and every θ j ∈ supp µ j .
Theorem 4.7. Under incomplete information, a strategy profile σ is stable if it is one of the following equilibria of G:
25 Ok and Vega-Redondo (2001) introduce a general evolutionary model with no observability.
They find that if the subgroups are relatively small (and the effective matching uncertainty is therefore large), materialist preferences are stable in a vast set of environments. For the issue of preference evolution with unobservable preferences, see also Ely and Yilankaya (2001) and Güth and Peleg (2001) .
(1) a strict Nash equilibrium; (2) a completely mixed Nash equilibrium; (3) the unique Nash equilibrium.
Proof. In each case, we suppose that the strategy profile σ is supported by a monomorphic configuration (µ, s) with materialist preferences. We will show that after mutants enter, every nearby set is nonempty if mutants' population shares are small enough. Then by Proposition 4.6, we can conclude that the Nash equilibrium σ is stable.
First, let σ = (a * 1 , . . . , a * n ) ∈ i∈N A i be a strict Nash equilibrium of G. Then for a materialist incumbent θ i in each i-th population, the inequality θ i (a
for all a i = a * i and all q −i ∈ U . Therefore, after an entry, the focal equilibrium exists if the population shares of mutants are sufficiently small regardless of mutants' strategies.
For the second, let σ be a completely mixed Nash equilibrium of G. Then we get
for an incumbent θ i in each i-th population, where a 1 i , . . . , a ki i are all pure strategies available to player i. We claim that after a mutant sub-profile θ J enters with its population share vector ε, the equilibrium s ∈ B 0 ( µ ε ) can be chosen such that the incumbents' post-entry strategy profile s(θ) tends to σ if ε tends to 0. To prove this, let s j (θ j ) = x j and s j ( θ j ) = x j if j ∈ J, and s j (θ j ) = σ j otherwise. Suppose that each x j is also a completely mixed strategy, so that in every i-th population, we have θ i (a
where the j-th component of x is (1 − ε j )x j + ε j x j if j ∈ J and it is σ j otherwise. Then for j ∈ J, the incumbent's strategy x j can be chosen as
for l = 1, . . . , k j , and so x j tends to σ j as ε j tends to 0, where x j is well defined if ε j < min{ σ j (a l j ), 1 − σ j (a l j ) | l = 1, . . . , k j }. Therefore, applying Kakutani's fixed point theorem to the mutants' best response correspondences, such a nearby equilibrium does exist.
Finally, suppose that the objective game G has a unique Nash equilibrium σ. Let θ J be an arbitrary mutant sub-profile with its population share vector ε, which induces a sequence { s t } of post-entry equilibria obtained by reducing the norm ε to 0. For the sequence { syields another refinement of the Nash equilibrium concept. In Example 4.4, we show that the equilibrium ((0.5, 0.5, 0), (0.5, 0.5, 0) ) is a stable aggregate outcome; however, the equilibrium strategy (0.5, 0.5, 0) is not a neutrally stable strategy because it can be displaced by (1, 0, 0). Compared to pre-programmed strategies, that incumbents adjust their strategies according to their beliefs would prevent them from being eliminated. Interestingly, such minor adjustments may lead to mutual benefits for both participants. A novelty in Theorem 4.7 is that the materialist preferences supporting a completely mixed Nash equilibrium would coexist with any new entrants, even though the completely mixed equilibrium consists of evolutionarily stable strategies.
Partial Observability
In this section, we assume that each player observes the opponents' types with some fixed probability p ∈ (0, 1), and knows his own type and the joint distribution over the opponents' types with the remaining probability 1 − p. The degree of observability p is common knowledge. The two realizations are independently distributed among the players, and these statuses are private information.
For a probability distribution µ ∈ M(Θ n ) and each i ∈ N , let b
Example 5.3. Let the objective game G be the following asymmetric two-player game, and suppose that the degree of observability p ∈ (0, 1).
a 21 a 22 a 11 5, 5 5, 0 a 12 0, 5 5, 10
By Theorem 3.6, the strategy profile (a 11 , a 21 ) is not stable for p = 1; by Theorem 4.7, it is stable for p = 0. We claim that this strategy profile (a 11 , a 21 ) is also stable for any p ∈ (0, 1). To see this, suppose that for each i ∈ {1, 2}, the i-th population consists of types for which a i1 is the strictly dominant strategy, and denote this configuration by (µ, b, s). Then we have b(θ) = (a 11 , a 21 ) and s(θ) = (a 11 , a 21 ) for all θ ∈ supp µ, and thus the aggregate outcome of (µ, b, s) is (a 11 , a 21 ). Let an indifferent mutant sub-profile θ 0 J with ε ∈ (0, 1)
|J| be introduced to check the stability. Obviously, any post-entry equilibrium must be a focal equilibrium pair relative to (b, s) , that is, B p ( µ ε ) = B p ( µ ε ; b, s) for any p ∈ (0, 1) and any ε ∈ (0, 1) |J| . In the case where |J| = 1, it is clear that mutants have no fitness advantage. Now let J = {1, 2}, and let ( b, s) ∈ B p ( µ ε ; b, s). Then the equalities
always hold. On the other hand, for each i ∈ {1, 2}, the average fitness of θ 0 i is
where a −i1 denotes the pure strategy a j1 with j = i. There are three cases to consider for strategies of the indifferent mutants. 
and all ε ∈ (0, 1) 2 .
Case 2:
for all p ∈ (0, 1) and all ε ∈ (0, 1) 2 . If b 1 ( θ 0 ) = a 11 and b 2 ( θ 0 ) = a 22 , we have
and s 2 ( θ The above discussion shows that the weakly Pareto-efficient strategy profile (a 11 , a 21 ) is stable for any p ∈ (0, 1), even though it is not Pareto efficient.
Instead of Pareto efficiency, we can show that weak Pareto efficiency is a necessary condition for pure-strategy outcomes to be stable under almost perfect observability. If a pure-strategy profile is strongly Pareto dominated by another strategy profile, then this outcome will be unstable for large enough degrees of observability. In such a case, entrants in every population can gain a fitness advantage over the incumbents, as described in the proof of the following theorem. While the necessity result under perfect observability is not robust, the analysis of this necessary condition still reveals that materialist preferences may have no evolutionary advantage even if preferences are are imperfectly observed.
Theorem 5.4. Let a * be a pure-strategy profile in G. If for anyp ∈ (0, 1) there exists p ∈ (p, 1) such that a * is stable for the degree p, then it is weakly Pareto efficient with respect to π.
Proof. Let p ∈ (0, 1) be a degree of observability, and suppose that a * is not weakly Pareto efficient with respect to π. Let (µ, b, s) be a configuration with the aggregate outcome a * . Then b(θ) = a * and s(θ) = a * for all θ ∈ supp µ. To prove the theorem, it suffices to show that there existsp ∈ (0, 1) such that the configuration (µ, b, s) is not stable for any p ∈ (p, 1). Because a * is not weakly Pareto efficient, there exists
, suppose that the mutants' strategies satisfy (1) b( θ 0 ) = σ and s( θ 0 ) = a * ; (2) for any nonempty proper subset T of N and any θ −T ∈ supp µ −T , the equality b j ( θ 0 T , θ −T ) = a * j holds for all j ∈ T . Then the focal set B p ( µ ε ; b, s) would be nonempty for an arbitrary population share vector ε ∈ (0, 1)
in average fitnesses between the mutant θ 0 i and the incumbent θ i is
Since π i (σ) > π i (a * ) for all i ∈ N and the game G is finite, there existsp ∈ (0, 1) such that for any p ∈ (p, 1), the inequality
i ∈ N and all θ i ∈ supp µ i , regardless of the population shares of the mutants.
Next we show that if a pure-strategy profile is not a Nash equilibrium of the objective game, then it is not stable when preferences are almost unobservable. This means that for the case of pure-strategy outcomes, the result of Theorem 4.5 is robust against small perturbations in the degrees of observability.
Theorem 5.5. Let a * be a pure-strategy profile in G. If for anyp ∈ (0, 1) there exists p ∈ (0,p) such that a * is stable for the degree p, then it is a Nash equilibrium of G.
Proof. Suppose that p ∈ (0, 1), and that a * is not a Nash equilibrium of G. Let (µ, b, s) be a configuration with the aggregate outcome a * . Then b(θ) = a * and s(θ) = a * for all θ ∈ supp µ. To prove the theorem, it suffices to show that there existsp ∈ (0, 1) such that the configuration (µ, b, s) is not stable for any p ∈ (0,p). Since a * is not a Nash equilibrium, there exists a strategy a k ∈ A k for some k ∈ N such that π k (a k , a * −k ) > π k (a * ). Consider the mutant type θ k appearing in the k-th population, for which a k is the strictly dominant strategy. For given p ∈ (0, 1) and η > 0, we assume that the nearby set B η p ( µ ε ; b, s) is nonempty whenever the population share ε of θ k is sufficiently small; otherwise (µ, b, s) is unstable for the degree p.
Then the post-entry average fitness of an individual θ k in the k-th population is
where we note that there are no new entrants except the mutants in the k-th We now turn our attention to the robustness of the preceding results concerning sufficient conditions for stability. The following theorem shows that the conclusion of Theorem 3.10 still holds for every degree p ∈ (0, 1), and so, by Theorem 4.7, it holds for all degrees of observability.
Theorem 5.6. Let G be a two-player game, and suppose that (a * 1 , a * 2 ) is Pareto efficient with respect to π. If (a * 1 , a * 2 ) is a strict Nash equilibrium of G, then (a * 1 , a * 2 ) is stable for all p ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. Let (a * 1 , a * 2 ) be a strict Nash equilibrium of G, and suppose that it is not stable for some p ∈ (0, 1). We will show that (a * 1 , a * 2 ) is not Pareto efficient with respect to π. Assume that for each i ∈ {1, 2}, the i-th population consists of the only type θ i for which a * i is the strictly dominant strategy, and denote this configuration by (µ, b, s) . Hence the focal set will be nonempty in any post-entry environment after mutants enter. Our assumption implies that the aggregate outcome of (µ, b, s) is (a * 1 , a * 2 ), and so this configuration (µ, b, s) is unstable for the degree p. This means that there exists some chance for a mutant sub-profile θ J to gain a fitness advantage over the incumbents.
In the case where |J| = 1, it is obvious that no mutant can have an evolutionary advantage since (a * 1 , a * 2 ) is a strict Nash equilibrium. In the case where J = {1, 2}, it must be true that for everyǭ ∈ (0, 1), there exist a population share vector ε ∈ (0, 1) 2 with ε ∈ (0,ǭ) and a focal equilibrium pair ( b, s) ∈ B p ( µ ε ; b, s) such that Π θi ( µ ε ; b, s) ≥ Π θi ( µ ε ; b, s) for every i ∈ {1, 2}, and Π θ k ( µ ε ; b, s) > Π θ k ( µ ε ; b, s) for some k ∈ {1, 2}. To complete the proof, we have to show that (a * 1 , a * 2 ) is Pareto dominated in any situation where the incumbents are driven out.
For ( b, s) ∈ B p ( µ ε ; b, s) and i ∈ {1, 2}, define z i : supp µ ε → ∆(A i ) by z i ( θ 1 , θ 2 ) = p b i ( θ 1 , θ 2 ) + (1 − p) s i ( θ i ). Then the post-entry average fitness of θ i ∈ supp µ i is Π θi ( µ ε ; b, s) = (1 − ε −i )π i (a * 1 , a * 2 ) + ε −i π i a * i , z −i (θ i , θ −i ) .
On the other hand, the post-entry average fitness of θ i ∈ (supp µ j ) c is Π θi ( µ ε ; b, s) = (1 − ε −i )π i z i ( θ i , θ −i ), a * −i + ε −i π i z 1 ( θ 1 , θ 2 ), z 2 ( θ 1 , θ 2 ) . With this kind of representation, the remaining part of the proof is exactly the same as that in Theorem 3.10.
From Theorem 4.7, we know that when opponents' preferences are unobservable, a pure-strategy outcome can be stable if it is a strict Nash equilibrium or the unique Nash equilibrium of the objective game. However, this result may not hold in the case of partial observability. If the degree of observability is positive, even arbitrarily small, then mutants may earn higher average fitnesses by adopting more efficient strategies only when they see and meet one another without affecting the incumbents' expectations and strategies; see the following Example. It indicates that efficiency would play a role in preference evolution as long as there is a positive probability of observing preferences.
Example 5.7. Suppose that the objective game G is the following Prisoner's Dilemma game. 
Conclusion
While an asymmetric game is a more realistic representation of most contests, it is virtually ignored in the literature on the evolution of preferences. In this paper, we focus our attention on the multi-population model, where players can distinguish their roles and may have different action sets. Our results reveal that materialist preferences may have no evolutionary advantage even if preferences are imperfectly observed. It turns out that there is a tendency towards some efficiency unless preferences are completely unobservable.
Besides, our sufficiency result under perfect observability is very different from any result in the evolutionary literature. It implies that the choice of the number of populations at nature's disposal is crucial in the evolution of preferences. We show that a sufficient condition for two-population stability cannot guarantee the existence of a stable outcome in a three-player game. Furthermore, the interactions among mutants exhibit how Pareto-efficient strong Nash equilibria are destroyed. This suggests that a wide variety of combinations of mutants can make a huge difference in stability results.
When preferences are unobservable, it is easy to see that materialist preferences have obvious evolutionary advantages in our model. Intuitively, non-materialist preferences will no longer have an effect as making a commitment if players cannot distinguish among the types of opponents. But since the existence of nearby equilibria is not guaranteed, it is not necessarily true that a materialist configuration must be stable. For example, suppose that the fitness assignment is described by the following asymmetric game, and that all populations consist of materialist preferences.
a 21 a 22 a 23 a 11 1, 1 1, 0 0, 0 a 12 1, 1 0, 0 1, 0
It is easy to verify that no matter what the equilibrium outcome is, the nearby equilibria do not exist after suitable mutants are introduced to perturb the equilibrium outcome. Thus, materialist preferences in such a case cannot form a stable configuration. However, we claim that a stable outcome does exist in this objective game. To prove this, let each i-th population consist of preferences for which a i1 is the strictly dominant strategy. Then a focal equilibrium exists for any entry, and mutants in the second population adopting strategies distinct from a 21 will be driven out. Therefore, the strategy profile (a 11 , a 21 ) is a stable aggregate outcome supported by these non-materialist preferences.
Finally, note that the above asymmetric game has no strictly perfect equilibria, which was introduced in Okada (1981) . It should be emphasized that the indirect evolutionary approach with incomplete information is a refinement of the Nash equilibrium concept different not only from the notion of a neutrally stable strategy, but also from the notion of a strictly perfect equilibrium.
